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European Studies, 25, 1976
The Politics of Southern
Europe
Spain, Portugal, Greece, ltaly and the EEC
The area rather loosely called'Southern Europe' or'Mediterranean Europe'
has recently become one of the most mutable parts of the European continent.
Broadly, Southern Europe includes Spain, Portugal, Italy andGreece, that is, the
counties peripheral to the European industrial heartland, but there is no clear
agreement on its limits.
The interest in Southern Europe centres principally on two things. Firstly, by
Western European standards there are very few democracies in the world -prob-
ably only about twenty-eight 
- 
and of these, seventeen or so are in Western
Europe. Any move away from authoritarian regimes towards more open or
pluralistic regimes in countries on the fringe of Western Europe is therefore of
great importance. Secondly, because the EEC is a powerful economic grouping
which admits new members, it has a magnetism for Southern Europe - most
notably Spain, Portugal, and Greece 
- 
and this puts the Commuhity in a unique
strategic and diplomatic position.
Economic similaritv
Unity is often imposed -on Southern Europe
externally, for example by the EEC and by NATO,
but there are some important features that the coun-
tries have in common. All are dependent economi-
cally on their northern neighbours, they all export
workers to the north, they bring in tourists,' and
they import investment from the north. Exports
from Southern Europe tend to be similar and mainly
agricultural; oranges, tobacco, wine, tomato paste,
etc. All the Southern European countries have
benefited from the general world economic boom
since the Second World War and have increased
their per capita gross national product (GNP) sub-
stantially. The growth rates from 1960-1973 have
been: for Spain, 5.8%; for Portugal, 5.4/"; for
Greece, 7 .2/"; for ltaly , 4.4"/" . (The se compare well
with Britain's 2.3Y".) Productivity in the manufac-
turing sector has been much higher than in other
sectors and this has profoundly transformed these
counffies, although they still all have a lower per
capita income than Britain. In all these states the
drift from the land is such that now fewer people are
employed in agriculture than ever before and they
are beginning to reach Western European levels of
prosperity. This trend has encouraged more open
and less rigid structures in society and may have
inlluenced the move towards democratisation. It
has certainly raised the standard of living of the
majority, a feature which has resulted not only in
increased expectations, but also in increased rela-
tive disparities between income groups.
Political Structure
Southern Europe has been, in a broad sense,
politically conservative since the war, and although
the status quo is more robust than it appears at first
sight the forces making for change are strong. In
political terms the Southern European countries
appear to be unstable, threatened by extremist fac-
tions and by the left, or with only a very loose grip
on constitutional government.
This is partly explained by a general human attri-
bute 
- 
the tendency for people to become less satis-
fied with a given social set-up as time passes, espe-
cially if it moves out of line with societies close by.
Though there is a marked difference between the
political structures of the countries of Southern
Europe (in some there are no legal parties while in
others there is a long tradition of open political
democracy) one of the most spectacular factors,
and one of the most difficult for Northern Euro-
peans to comprehend, has been the general re-
emergenc€ of the communists into open politics.
The exact significance of this development is a sub-ject of some debate, and varies from country to
country. In Portugal it meant, on November 25th
1975, a defeat for the old-fashioned Leninism which
has been the basis of most communist strategy since
the war. The disciplined hierarchical organisation
with an elite at the top telling,the mass at the bottom
what to do, has crumbled. This is particularly so in
Italy.
In Spain, the communist party is very similar to
the Italian communist party and insists on the
maintenance of human rights, freedom of speech,
assembly and private property 
- 
the so-called
'bourgeois' freedoms 
- 
for its own wlnerability is
such that it cannot afford to offend the norms of the
Western European democratic tradition. A feature
of communist parties in Southern Europe is their
poor showing in authoritarian, post-civil war states
such as Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent,
Greece. The collapse of the Colonels in Greece did
not mean the triumph of the left 
- 
let alone the
communists 
- 
but the victory of the de Gaulle-like
figure of Karamanlis. Greece thus re-affirmed the
monopoly of the righUcentre right, which has been a
feature of Greek politics for the last half century.
In Spain, Portugal and Greece, although flar.n-
boyantly evident, the communists are in fact weak.
The situation is different in Italy, where the com-
munists (PCI) are a major force largely because the
Italian political system faces two intractable prob-
lems. One is the collapse of the state as a modern
organisation, for ltaly is an advanced country heav-
ily influenced by an under-developed south, a situa-
tion which ultimately stems from the lack of success
of the northern Italians in setting up an effective
centralised administration. The second problem
results from the collapse of the Christian Democrats(CD) as one of the main anti-communist forces, a
fact in part due to its failure to meet the needs of the
urban population for social justice and efficiency in
government and administration. With the Italian
political system thus disintegrating internally the
PCI appears a relatively effective administrative
party. Fundamentally the Italian crisis is one of
political civilisation within Italy and the adaptation
of the PCI to Western European norms is essen-
tia-lly a problem for Italy, though it affects foreign
affairs.
It should also be noted that for many centuries
now Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece have been
used to seeing major decisions affecting their
economy, society, and politics being taken else-
where (in the USA, Germany, the UK or the EEC).
In political terms these societies are reactive and
expect to be buffeted and moved by the major
industrial and social forces of the outside world.
The idea of total control of the political and
economic environment is not one which is normal in
Southern Europe.
Strategy
In strategic terms it is difficult to separate South-
ern Europe from the Mediterranean as a whole. The
security of pro-Western countries is based on the
NATO alliance and even France, which is not in the
NATO organisation, cooperates with the USA in
the Mediterranean. But the possible increase of
communist influence may present problems, par-
ticularly in Italy (which guards NATO's southern
flank), though the PCI has commented that when
Italy has communists in government 'that will be
time when it needs NATO most'.
In the Mediterranean naval power is, of course,
vital, as any contemplated invasion or disruption
would depend on naval superiority. Since 1964
there has been an entry of the Soviet fleet into the
Mediteranean and this fact has added to super-
power rivalry in the area. However, although the
Soviet Navy has a considerable presence in the
Middle East and Mediterranean, it needs local
bases and supplies, both of which (as the recent
capricious eviction of the Soviet Navy from Egypt
has shown) are very vulnerable. The Soviets cannot
expect the kind of help the Americans received to
boost Israel in the 1973 crisis in the Middle East.
Southern Europe is an area where detente and the
relaxation of tension between the two super-powers
can generate difficulties. The possibility of a direct
super-power confrontation is remote and the stable
balance has allowed national conflicts (e.g. between
NATO allies Greece and Turkey) and social prob-
lems to become more salient. The movement of
super-power conflict away from central fronts and
out of direct confrontation can be said to have
transferred 'competition' to the peripheries and has
thus increased the danger of conflict in Southern
Europe.
In Southern Europe there is no really distinct
NATO strategy although a flexible American pres-
ence acts as a substitute for alliance strategy,
despite an un-coordinated military policy and dis-
agreements amongst the allies. This multilateral
alliance structure is incapable of imposing a policy
in Southern Europe and the political and economic
institutions are weak; no attempt has been made to
use NATO in the Greek/Turkish disputes.
The US relationship with Spain, Portugal, Italy
and Greece is changing. Portugal has expeilenced a
revolution; in Italy the PCI seem ready for govern-
ment; Greece has suspended its participation in
NATO and Spain is changing regimes. In the wider
Mediterranean, Malta is politically turbulent,
Cyprus is divided, and Turkey is intensifying
relations with the USSR and Arab countries.
NATO's bi-lateral framework of American relation-
ships with Southern Europe has seen an increasing
concentration of power in US hands. The military
situation is also deteriorating as new problems arise
in the Mediterranean. These include the oil prob-
lem, fishing and offshore rights, nuclear prolifera-
tion, and social problems affecting military stability(budgetary shortcomings, internal strife, ordinary
soldier's political affiliations, etc.). Stability and
security, both internal and international, no longer
seem to be guaranteed in the area.
Another aspect of strategy in Southern Europe is
the problem of the delegation of initiative, either to
the USA or to Europe. The USA has the interven-
tion capabilities, internal cohesion, and a global out-
look. Bilateral negotiations, however, mean that the
Americans can arrive at contradictory decisions
and that they do not have efficient instruments to
cope with an overall Mediterranean crisis as well as
maintaining East-West balances of power. What is
happening is that the US is yielding to ever more
demanding requests (e.g. on nuclear reactors for
Spain) and seeing its freedom of action limited.
The alternative possibility is of delegation of
initiative to the Europeans, but they lack the
instruments for effective military intervention,
although the economic instruments at the EEC's
disposal are important. The most relevant Euro-
pean answer to the Mediterranean crisis is the pos-
sibility of offering a new stable framework of inter-
national relations in which the Southern European
countries could find their place, through the proces-
ses of association and integration. This has worked
already in ltaly, Portugal and Greece.
The EEC in Southern Europe
The dominance of the super-powers has led the
Southern Europeans to seek alternative political
structures. The EEC emerges as a natural focus 
-
an organisation to which they can aspire and where
as members they can get first class citizenship.
Because the EEC figures as an organisation that
they can possibly join, the Community has an influ-
ence on internal politics. Thus in Portugal the EEC
put conditions on loans in a way that the super-
powers could not have done.
In Italy, the PCI tends to insist on the importance
of the development of the EEC in a democratic
direction and on the need to bring European points
of view (on subjects varying from strategy to multi-
nationals) to bear on the USA. There is a
divergence of the PCI's attitudes from the old-
fashioned communist parties and the Italian com-
munists are in some ways quite close to the found-
ing fathers of the EEC. The chance of political suc-
cess gives the Italian and Spanish communists a
greater interest in being unorthodox communists
within an EEC 
- 
Western European context than if
they were operating in Eastern Europe, where the
Russian presence would force them to behave in a
more traditional manner. One cloud on the horizon
is that the close links between the Italians and the
Yugoslavs may mean that if there were a major
crisis in Yugoslavia (there has been a remise en
ordre by Tito but the crisis is still potential) and thatif this upheaval were exploited by the USSR to
bring Yugoslavia into the Russian sphere, then it
would be severely disruptive over a wide range of
European interests.
Compared with Italy, Iberia is at the other end of
the political spectrum, but the EEC has exerted
considerable inlluence there of late. In Portugal the
EEC's influence was seen through a clear statement(in July 1975) that the funds being sought by the
Portuguese were dependent on a Western European
style democratic outcome to the revolution. This
was not, of course, the dominant factor in the out-
come of the events of summer 1975, for more was
done through the Social Democratic parties than
through European politics. Nevertheless, the EEC
was able to make statements about internal politics
that neither super-power could have done. In Spain,
the desire for West European approval and EEC
membership is much more public and it is almost
official policy that the Spanish government tailor
their regime to fit it for EEC entry.
The EEC, whatever its many weaknesses, has a
rOle thrust upon it and the belief that it might be
possible to join at sometime in the future is perva-
sive in Greece, Spain and Portugal.
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Though Spain and Portugal are often bracketed together there is some doubt
as to how far similarities really extend, for despite superficial histoical resemb-
lances, differences often outweigh similarities. Nevertheless, the two states of the
peninsula both suffered considerable economic backwardness relative to the rest
of Europe and until very recently they both experienced the most old-fashioned(quasi-fascist) regimes in the West. Portugal and Spain also both endured per-
sonal dictatorships instituted in the inter-war period, regimes totally out of line
with the general European political experience since 1945. Spain was ruled by
General Franco whose side had won the internally disruptive Spanish Civil War in
1939, and Portugal was ruled by the dictator Salazar who, like Franco, hadfascist
support.
Portugal
Summary of political developments
In Portugal the political problem amounts to the
fact that the military coup d'etat which overthrew
the dictatorship of Dr. Caetano (Salazar's succes-
sor) on April 25th 1974 effectively destroyed the
discredited old regime but did not usher in any
successor. Throughout the 1960's the Salazar
government tried to maintain a hold over its African
colonies, despite general decolonisation by other
European powers, the increasing military support
for local guerilla movements, and the enormous
drain on the country's limited resources. This situa-
tion led to the formation of the armed forces move-
ment (MFA), a group of officers who came to see
the war as ultimately unwinnable but who could see
no prospect of an end to the fight if the Salazar
regime continued in power. This conclusion was not
particularly perspicacious as the war was so obvi-
ously impossible to win and hence the MFA origi-
nally included officers of different political persua-
sions, many of whom were conservative, united
only in their opposition to the 'unwinnable' war.
The titular head of the April 25th coup d'etat was
General Spinola, who had written a book about the
Portuguese colonial wars implying that the govern-
ment's strategy was misguided. The Caetano gov-
ernment permitted the publication of the book,
probably to test public opinion, but in so doing they
misjudged the extent and depth of the opposition,
particularly within the army. Spinola's book
became a detonator for political events and he thus
became an obvious leader for the first government
of the military coup that he had 
- 
probably unwit-
tingly 
- 
inspired.
Spinola's supporters were moderates who
wanted a negotiation of some sort of African colo-
nial independence and who at home wanted to
reform the system into a conservative democracy.
However, Spinola ran into the opposition of the
Communist Party and the socialists who, working
together, encouraged certain MFA officers to block
his path. At that time the programme of the MFA
was of a Western 'democratic' sort and one of the
milestones on the road to Spinola's fall was the
installation of Vasco Gongalves as Prime Minister.
It was this move which put a radical at the heart of
the country's affairs and blocked the appeal to any
silent majority that Spinola might have hoped to call
on. Radicalisation proceeded apace after the April
1975 elections and reached its high spot in the sum-
mer of that year before tapering off, following
communist inspired events (described below) and
an attempted radical take-over on November 25th
1975.
The revolution which overthrew the old regime
also changed land and property distribution. During
the events of the summer of 1975 the agricultural
workers seized some of the land they worked on the
great plain, Alentejo, south of Lisbon. These were
big latifundia (estates), often out of production,
where cooperatives, run by the Portuguese Com-
munist Party, replaced landowners. The six great
banks which dominated the economy of the country
were nationalised and the state now owns almost all
the important sectors of the economy. This does not
mean a modern social democracy (a mixed
economy with government-directed industry play-
ing a big rdle) because the state apparatus contains
many people elevated as a result of Salazar's politi-
cal appointments, leaving the administration weak
and under-trained. From the top there is little direc-
tion, government interference, or policy. However,
now that the 1976 municipal and Presidential elec-
tions are over, effective, if unpopular, action can be
taken providing the political will exists.
The Regions and Social Structure
Since the turmoils of summer 1974, political
developments have been rapid, but whoever is in
power has to deal with certain intractable economic
problems. The country has a population of
9,014,000 (including one million in Lisbon) with two
million immigrants, an illiteracy rate of between 30
and 40"/" (inland it may reach 70o/o), 2,300,000
unemployed, an active working population of 36.5o/o
of the total population (of which about one-third are
in agriculture, 327o in industry and 360/o in tertiary
employment), a per capita income of $780, a huge
trade deficit, and a steeply increasing cost-ofJiving,
The whole Portuguese economy is heavily depen-
dent on the outside world (particularly West Ger-
many and Britain), exporting textiles, wood pulp
and fish.
Portugal is a small and homogeneous country but
there are important regional differences, the princi-
pal one being the nortl/south split. The north is
Catholic, the south is dechristianised and has been
so for a very long time 
- 
i.e. the people are neither
baptised, confirmed, nor married in church. There
is a system ofstrip agriculture in the north, produc-
ing diverse, yet small quantities of crops, with such
backward methods as the Roman hoe and oxen. In
the south, wheat and cork trees are farmed exten-
sively, though not intensively as in southern Italy.
In the south the economy only gives partial emp-
loyment every year and the inefficiency of agricul-
ture means that Portugal imports such staples as
flour and sugar. Nevertheless over a third of the
people still work the land, and live in country where
there is no access by roads. By all indicators, there-
fore, Portugal is the most backward state in West-
ern Europe.
Political Groups
There are four broad political groups in Portugal;
the socialists, the communists, the leftists and the
righVcentre. The Portuguese Socialist Party (the
PSP) emerged in 1972 and gets the bulk of its sup-port from the middle-classes in the industrial
centres of Lisbon, Oporto, Faro, and Marinha
Grande, though it has working-class support as
well. The PSP has been in favour of planned
economic control of the main sectors of the
economy through state approval of all investment.
It has supported the public ownership of land, pub
lic investment programmes, anti-trust legislation,
and has condemned attacks on freedom of expres-
sion.
The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was
founded in l92l and survived clandestinely despite
vigorous persecution. It has large working-class and
trade union support and a big party organisation
with a party press. PCP tactics seem to have been to
try to share power by backing the provisional gov-
ernment and to build up its support for elections,
but it refused to enter into a debate with the PSP in
the early revolution.
There is a whole plethora of leftist groups, but the
other main political force is the PPD, a liberal-
centrist party which has acted as a hold-all party for
the conservative and non-socialist voters. The PPD
has distinct regional differences, especially in the
north, where it tends to be a Catholic-conservative
party and where it gets its biggest vote.
Portugal since the Coup
Since the revolution (1974 until 1976) Portugal
has lived through unintemrpted chaos with various
factions fighting for control of the MFA as the
economy collapsed. There have been two military
presidents and six successive cabinets while outside
forces have competed with each other to try to
influence the course of events within the country.
On May 15th the first provisional government
was formed by Spinola, with a liberal as Premier
and a cabinet including several socialists, two
communists, and other'personalities'. However,
by late autumn 1974 deterioration had started, with
the communists and their close allies taking over
municipal councils (simply because they were the
only organised force) and then taking over Intersin-
dical, the newly created Labour confederation. The
PCP was also infiltrating the press, radio, and TV.
Parallel to this the Armed Forces Assembly (240
officers) had begun to usurp cabinet power and this
body too became vociferously radical. All over Por-
tugal chaotic acts of de faclo nationalisation by thegovernment and worker's commissions began to
take place. On the last day of September 1974
Spinola resigned the Presidency and he was
replaced by General Costa Gomes (nominated by
the Armed Forces) with Vasco Gongalves as
Premier.
On March llth 1975, Spinola participated in an
attempted coup of obscure design and he was
forced to flee from Portugal after its failure.l The
coup led to an enormous increase of influence by
the left and the communists, but the MFA assumed
overall control of politicians, setting up a Supreme
Council of the revolution, which effectively became
the leadership. This new council did not halt the
elections, which were held to schedule on April
25th 1975.
Within a matter of days after the election there
was a new crisis when the MFA allowed the com-
munists to take-over the pro-socialist newspaper
I Spinola was allowed to retum ln August 1976.
Republica. Republica's seizure raised issues about
the freedom of the press in Portugal but the efforts
of the socialists to get the paper returned to the
owners met with initial failure. The event highlight-
ed the fact that Portugal, with numerous opposition
papers of all persuasions except fascist, whilst
not a left dictatorship, was still not a complete
democracy.
July 1975 saw the most serious political crisis
since the Spinola coup, with the resignation of the
socialist leader Soares over the Republica affur(still in dispute) and Premier Vasco Gongalves
announcing that the MFA would rule indefinitely,
excluding intermediaries such as political parties.
Soares concluded, in a note to Gomes, that the
communists were 'trying to conquer power by
undemocratic means' despite electoral defeat. The
socialists started their war against the communists
and later in summer 1975 the communist leader
Cunhal concluded that his moment to bid for power
had arrived. The communists started lining up their
supporters in the armed forces and unions ready for
a take-over. As the crisis developed Vasco Gon-
galves refused to resign, Antunes (the last moderate
in the cabinet) was dismissed, and the government
virtually ceased to function. The socialists could at
this time have paralysed the country with strikes
1975 March
April
Brief political chronologr
1968 September 
- 
Salazar (dictator) suffers incapacitat-
ing stroke.
- 
Dr. Marcello Caetano nominated
'acting' Prime Minister.
1970 July 
- 
Salazar dies.
1973 October 
- 
Rumbling discontent. Threat of mass
resignation by ofticers in army.
1974 February 
- 
General Spinola's bookPortugal and
the Future is circulated.
April 
- 
Army coup d'etat. Caetano deposed.May 
- 
Liberal/centrist party (PPD) formed.
September 
- 
Spinola critical of direction of
revolution.
- 
Attempted counter-coup. Spinola and
his supporters flee Portugal.
- 
Elections: Socialist 38o/", WD 28yo,
PCP 13Y", Social Democratic Centre
E%, PDP 5%.
May 
- 
Typographers (PCP backed) prevent
printing of Republica.
Socialists leave government.
June 
- 
Cunhal (PCP leader) states: "There
will be no Parliament in this
country. "
August 
- 
NorthernpeasantsattackPCPoffices.
September 
- 
Gongalves (an ex P.M.) becomes head
of state.
October 
- 
Balance of payments deficit (Jan-
Sept.) is $2.9 millard Francs.
December 
- 
MFAdissolved as military recognises
civilian supremacy.
1976 April 
- 
Second legislative elections Cfable I)June 
- 
Eanes elected president (Table II)
November 
- 
Split in the Socialist Party. Soares
leadership challenged.
and the communists were in no position to carry out
a coup; meanwhile the moderate officers were rally-
ing around Antunes. With communist influence in
the unions waning and with attacks on their offices
in the north starting, Cunhal decided to try a Coup.
This was beaten off and the communists put on the
defensive. Shortly afterwards Gonqalves was
forced to resign and in mid-September a new
cabinet was sworn in with seats distributed on the
basis of the April percentage vote. (See Table I.)
The revolution itself produced two leaders in
Soares and Major Antunes. Cunhal turned out to be
yastly overrated whilst Costa Gomes emerges from
the history of both the Salazar years and the years
since the coup as a master politician, as does the
new President Eanes, who, although still largely
unknown, may prove to be a very tough figure.
Portugal after the 1976 elections faces the task of
rebuilding the country on the basis of a socialist
government, led by Soares, which just failed to get
an overall majority in parliament. However, severe
economic problems remain unsolved and it may be
doubted whether the government can tackle them.
Furthermore, the nature of the new Portuguese
regime is not fully established; it may become a
Presidential regime under the figure of Eanes or
something even less democratic.
Table I
Portugal 1976 Legislative elections
Socialist
Popular Democratic
Social Democratic Centre
Communist
Popular Democratic Union
Popular Socialist Front
Movement for the reorganisation
of the Party of the Parliament
Leftist Socialist movement
Christian Democratic
Monarchist
International Communist League
Portuguese Communist
Marxist-I-eninist
Workers
Revolutionary Workers
Vote o/o Deputies
1,887,180 34.97 106
1,296,432 24.03 7t
858,432 15.91 4t
785,620 t4.56 40
9l,383 L69 I
41,954 0.78
36,237 0.67
3l,065 0.58
28,226 0.52
28,t63 0.52
16,235 0.30
15,801 0.29
15,671 0.29
5,t82 0.10
61.5y"
16.57"
14.4"/"
7.6/"
Table tr
Portuguesc hesidential Elections June 1976
(No Party) General Ant6nio Eanes
(Far left) Otelo de C-arvalho(hime Minister) Jos6 Pinheiro de Azevedo
(Communist) Oct6vio Pato
Spain
Spain, as the tourist advertisements used to say, 'is dffirent'. It is certainly one
of the least understood of modern European states. Unlike Portugal, the possibil-
ity of a civil war seems remote. There is no colonial conflict because Spain has
managed to divest itself of its one outstanding colony (the Spanish Sahara) and
the army itself, unlike the Portuguese army, will not be the power base for any
faction unless the internal situation gets wildly out of hand. The government in
Spain has evidently determined to move slowly and carefully, steering between
the extreme right (who are not demoralised in Spain as they are in the rest of
Western Europe) and the left oppositionforces, who believe that their hour has
come and who want to see definite evidence of reform. The dangers are that the
government will either end up by steering into one of these rocks or by being
crushed between them, though it has so far shown great resolution.
Contemporary Spain
Recent political developments in Spain have
come at a time of rapid economic development. In
1940 Spain's per capita income was about $200 per
year, but Spain is now in the top ten of the industrial
league and per capita incomes are approaching
$1,500 per year. Spain has participated in the gen-
eral Western boom; in 1973 tourism brought in
$2,386m, $1,718m in remittances came from over-
seas workers and some $852m entered Spain as
investment, which cash flow overcame the trade
deficit of $2,939m. Exports were transformed in
kind and quantity through the '50s and '60s by par-
ticipation in the boom, rather than by Franco or his
regime, which simply presided over the operation.
Political behaviour in Spain may also have become
more similar to Western European norms owing to
a social structure which has been transformed since
the Civil War. There is now a new managerial
middle-class which views the EEC as a means of
development, and a working-class which seems to
be conscious that the achievement of full democra-
tic rights, rather than violent transformation, is the
important aim. Since Franco's death there has been
an awareness of the lack of legitimacy of the
regime. Franco did have a certain sort of charisma-
tic power but there is now a recognition of the
impossibility of using the Franco institutions indefi-
nitely. There is a growing pressure for democracy,
evidenced by the waves of strikes which lost the
country eight million working days in the first two
and a half months of 1976 (more than in 1974 and
1975 together and including as many as 700,000
people at a time). Spain in many respects seems to
be ripe for democracy and all forces except the
extreme left and right are aware of this fact.
One of Spain's most developed institutions is the
army, about which it is difficult to get accurate
information, but its dominant characteristic seems
to be the view of itself as a strictly professional
body (unlike the Portuguese army) and this may
mean a predisposition towards non-intervention in
politics.
Franco's Spain
Franco's Spain, whilst undemocratic, was not afully grown fascist political system but an
authoritarian regime, insofar as power was based on
the apathy of the masses and not on their mobilisa-
tion as under the fascist model. Franco counted on
the support of the traditional rulers and had to
adjust to their interests. There was a modicum of
pluralism and opposition, but no parties and no
open political groups. Demands were put through a
vast number of pressure groups, from the army, to
the Church, the Chamber of Commerce, and
Falange.l
If the Franco regime was a balancing of interests
among the conservative supports of the system it
was also directionless and a regime in which Franco
had the final say: crucial decisions were taken on
obscure, if not capricious, bases. There was, for
example, no clear determination to modernise the
economy until the mid-1950s. Reluctance to change
was very great, but eventually took place both
because of US pressure and to ensure the regime's
survival. Sometime after the 1951 wave of strikes,
the Franco regime abandoned most of its early(proto-fascist) economic ideas and turned to
orthodox public sector management, with an open
economy and free market.
Politica! Forces on the Right
Spain is now faced with three forces. On the
right, there are those (sometimes called, after
Hitler's last supporters, 'the bunker') who want to
return to right wing principles and, whilst they
would be obliterated in any free elections, they are
still strong within the institutions, notably the
Cortes (the Parliament), the police, and the Com-
mission of the Realm and hence could be capable of
halting reform. The extreme right is willing to em-
ploy violence to provoke disorder and make Spain
hesitate before democratising any further. Disorder
in Spain would be far more damaging and bloody
tharrin Portugal where there were no deaths during
the April revolution. The Francoist die-hards would
like to give the impression that democracy and sta-
bility are incompatible. The second force, rep-
resented by Arias Navarro, wishes to respect the
Franco heritage, yet evolve. The third tendency is
that shown by Ibarne and Arielza, who want con-'
trolled reform towards democracy. At present there
is a tug-of-war between the right wing 'immobilists'
and the conservative movement, the outcome of
which will depend on a number of imponderables,
mainly whether the government can keep its nerve
and whether the terrorist incidents frighten people
away from reforms. The Prime Minister, Sr.
Suarez, was an admirer of Franco and a member of
Falange but was associated with the February 1974
'liberalisation'.
Opposition in Spain
One of the paradoxical features of the left has
been the presence of a 'moderate' Spanish Com-
I The Falange are the Fascrst Natlonal Socralst, anttsapltahst, Spantsh natlonahsts.
They include the bluesh[t veterans of the Spanrsh dtvrstons who fought uth the
Gemans on the RussEn front Assoctated wrth them are the right wing teronst
groups, such as the 'warnors of Chnst the Krng', who have been responsrble for
various atlacks on left or opposttron supptrters and perhaps even bombrngs.
munist Party (PSE). The PSE has long been one of
the least orthodox of European communist parties
and it has often (at least since it became any kind of
political presence) stood for moderate reform, the
protection of human rights and the 'democratic
bourgeois' freedoms. The leader of the PSE, San-
tiago Carrillo, is a skilful politician who has suc-
ceeded in bringing his party into friendly relations
with'bourgeois' liberals. The PSE heavily criticised
Russia's subjection of Czechoslovakia iir 1968 and
has a strong foothold in the Workers' Commissions,
the illegal trade unions.2
On the non-communist left the Spanish socialists
are split into several branches although moves are
in progress to unite them under one banner. The
PSOE, the Socialist Labour Party, is affiliated to
the Socialist International and is the largest of the
socialist parties. However, for many years the
PSOE was run by Spanish socialists in exile and the
party atrophied, losing contact with the militants in
Spain. Within the country the party is now less well
organised and active than the communists. The
PSOE are influential in white-collar and lower
middle-class unions rather than in the manual
working-class where the PSE predominates. There
are also other socialist groups and regional socialist
movements whose support is difficult to estimate,
but probably the most important is Confederacion
Socialista, the Popular Spanish Socialist Party of
Tierno Galvan which is social democratic in ten-
dency, but with a Marxist wing.
The exact support for the parties of the left is
difficult to estimate in the absence of legal opinion
polls but the probability is that the PSOE is the
largest party on the left.r There are also very large
Christian Democrat opposition groups (led by Gil
Robles) and liberal groups of indeterminate size.
Some thirteen groups including all the opposition
parties of the left and some Christian Democrats
have now amalgamated to form the Alliance of
Democratic Co.ordination, which has agreed on the
necessity to bring in a liberal-democratic regime as
soon as possible 
- 
though it has reached consensus
on very little else.
Problems of Development
Spain also has severe regional problems, concen-
trated on Catalonia and the Basque country, but
also appearing in the Canaries, Galicia and other
areas. Probably some form of devolution will be
introduced and the levelling out of regional ine-
qualities may have lessened this problem since the
1930s. It is important to note that Spanish
regionalism stems from the industrialisation and
over-development of Catalonia and the Basque
country vis-d-vis Madrid, not underdevelopment(i.e. the reverse of regional disequilibrium else-
where in Europe). There is already an illegal Cata-
lan Assembly in existence and Basque terrorists(ETA) have increased the political pressure in the
north to such an extent that over-reaction by the
central government would easily provoke a
separatist backlash.
Of the other problems facing Spain, apart from
liberalisation, one of the most pressing is that of
fiscal reform. Spain is one of the least and most
2 The Workere' Commrssions ue clandestine asscnhons of workers who refuse to
acc.ept the_ g-ovemment-run tmde untons. They are extremely efriclent at organisrng
strikes and demonstrations,.though their actuai numbem are unknwn. Their-prestigE
is such that they my persist after the legatsation of the clandesune tmde'union-s,
panrcularly if the latter are split betwen rival factons.
-The two clandestine trade unions are Union Sindical Obrera (USO) and UGT, thehistoric saralist union structure. sme sections of whch are fiercelv anti-communist.
Nether of these two union fedemtions hs the mobihsing powei of the Workers'
Comissions and because of rrvalry may be unable to combihe in the futurc.
ineffrciently taxed countries in Europe. A measure
of fiscal reform is needed to bring in more revenue
to pay for welfare benefits and cushion the unem-
ployment which will stem from recession. This is
consistent with the belief held by many that the real
threat to Spain comes not from the communists, or
the Falangists, or from regional separatism, but
from severe and lasting unemployment. Fiscal
reform, too, will be a pre-requisite for Spanish entry
into the EEC, a move which would expose Spain to
the full competition of the most modern states in
Europe. The restructuring of the Spanish bureauc-
racy will also be placed high on the list of the
priorities of any new government.
One further unresolved problem is the possibility
that workers will put a strain on the economy of
Spain through increased wage demands. The rate of
inflation was 22o/o for the first few months of 1976
and it has been suggested that the demands of the
working-class will be such as to destroy any form of
Spanish democracy. However, the left is well aware
of this problem and the introduction of democracy
in Spain would probably mean an effort on behalf of
the opposition parties to gain consent for a wages
policy, though this is not yet clear.
Conclusion
Spain of the 1970s has little in common with the
Spain of the pre-war period. A new country, com-
parable to Italy after the war in 1944, with perhaps
the qualification that it is slightly better placed
economically, has aligned itself with Western
European democracies. Regional demands still
exist, but these (with the exception of ETA) are
demands for more local autonomy rather than
claims which are incompatible with the existence of
the Spanish state itself, and these demands will
probably not tear the state apart unless things go
very wrong.
Juan Carlos has a difficult position as King of a
state which'expects rapid and visible changes but
who is supported by groups who oppose change. A
particularly acute problem for Juan Carlos is that
the parties ofthe left in Spain have stated that they
will not accept a partially democratic system in
which the communists are not legal. Thus the King
could easily scare that part of his support afraid of
change if he legalises the PSE, although this is in
turn a pre-requisite for the participation of the other
parties in any democratic elections that Spain may
hold in the future. Repression and tolerance have
been the features of post-Franco policy so far, but
the impatience of the country is demonstrated by
the number of shootings 
- 
more since Franco's
death than in the two years before.
Juan Carlos' second government was headed by a
new Premier, Adolfo Suarez. Suarez was a young
and relatively unknown man who in 1974 founded
the Union of the Spanish People, a political associa-
tion (not a political party, which would have been
illegal) based on respect for the constitution and the
maintenance of order, but open to reform. Suarez
accepts the left-wing opposition, though the climate
in which the second government took over was one
in which left-wing meetings'were still liable to be
banned or broken up.
3 lt is dfficult to estlmate what the possrble supptrt of any partles would be ln
"f "itio* 
-Sore'opinion polls have bein taken bii these are unreliable - the com-
.un,.s 
-infrr cet'anvthrrig between 8 and 22olo. the socialists 14-46%. the ChnstEnb"*'*"it'ij-iiv". iti &t.er. risht 4'l., and the Francotst establishrcnt fromyt2/".
SPAIN 
- 
Brief political chronolog;t
1939 End of Civil War 
- 
Franco, as dic-
tator, keeps Spain neutral in Second
World War.
1957 February 
- 
Opus Dei, a Catholic technocratic
group, enters government.
- 
Spain negotiates with EEC.
- 
USSpain agreements.
- 
Spain's first economic plan.
- 
State of Emergency. .
- 
Juan Carlos presented :rs successor
to Franco.
1970 June 
- 
EEC and Spain trade agreement.
December 
- 
State of Emergency in Biscay.
l97l July 
- 
JuanCarlosinstructedtotakeoverin
1972 lnly
case of Franco's illness.
- 
Carrero Blanco designated future
head of government under Juan
Carlos.
1962 February
l!)63 September
1963 December
1969 January
JulY
193 June
December
March
1975 November
1976 January
March
March
August
November
December
- 
Carrero Blanco made Prime Minister.
- 
Blanco assassinated. Arias Navarro
appointed Prime Minister.
- 
Puig (anarchist) garotted.
- 
Franco dies. Juan Carlos becomes
head of state.
- 
General strike.
- 
Vitoria: 4 killed, 100 wounded by
police.
- 
Junta Democratica (communist led)
arfi Platforma merge to form a new
opposition group 
- 
Democratic Co-
ordination.
- 
New government under Suarez
formed by Juan Carlos.
- 
Cortes approves reforms and its own
abolition by 425 to 59. Ineffectual
extreme right demonstrations on the
anniversary of Franco's death.
- 
Referendum on government
reforms.
Italy
Since the Second World War ltalian politics have been dominated by the big
conservative Catholic party, the Christian Democrats (CD). After the late 1940s
when the Cold War split ltalian politics and when Christian Democrat, De Gas-
peri, expelled the socialists and communists from government, the CD went on to
win a majority victory at the polls- Since that time, however, there hqs been a
steady decline of the CD vote, though all governments have been dominated by
them and many have involved other political parties, including the socialists. Italy
has in effect been characterised by chronic governmental instability, as govern-
ment after government has struggled to cope with ltalian problems. There have
been ten governments and five dffirent Prime Ministers since ltaly's 1968 elec-
tion. The present position is such that all forces in ltalian politics recognise that
democracy is so weak that the CD must, of necessity, be an essential element of
any coalition for the foreseeable future.
Present Politica! Scene
Despite the post-war economic miracle Italy's
problems remain, for they are deep rooted. Firstly,
the economic benefits of the boom have been
unevenly spread and secondly the reform of tax
laws, housing, social welfare, the health service,
and public facilities has made virtually no progress.
The problems are compounded by the general
Western European social ferment 
- 
the growth of
working-class militancy since 1968, increasing
trade-union militancy, and mounting social ten-
sions, all of which have hit Italy very hard. Lack of
money, coupled with the unwillingness and in-
capacity of the public administration to make meas-
ures work, show that simply putting laws on the
statute book in ltaly does not mean reform.
Moreover, even mild measures of reform can be
enough to frighten segments of the middle-class
away from the CD and force the party to adopt a
more rigid line.
ltalian politics have not recovered from the blow
dealt by the result of the referendum on divorce in
1974. T\e referendum involved a straight yes/no
vote without the complicating factor of the prefer-
ence vote which encourages factionalism and
clientalism. t The result was an enormous 60% for
the prodivorce forces 
- 
principally the socialists
and communists 
- 
and a setback for the CD. The
Christian Democrats were put on the defensive not
only by this referendum result, but also by a series
of scandals and by local elections which showed
that the communists had made great gains. Voices
I ltahan polttrcs are pervaded with the lnslltutron of chentalsm 
- 
the patron-chent
relatron 
- 
whrch makes politrcs qurte drsbnctively drfferent and unpredrctable by
Northern European standards
have begun to be heard calling for an alliance of the
left (as in France) between the socialists and com-
munists, but basically the alliance between the CD
and the socialists (PSI) still holds.
Though fascism has been illegal in Italy since
1945 the CD are flanked on the right by a small
quasi-fascist group, the MSI, some of whose mem-
bers are willing to employ violence in an attempt to
prevent communists gaining at the polls or in gov-
ernment. The MSI, which gains votes when the CD
appears to waver in its anti-communism, recruits
from among army and military officers, the civil
service, and the secret service, all areas which were
hardly touched by the ineffectual 'cleansing' of
fascists after the war.
Italy has always been a country for political
experiment and a nation that gave the world fascism
is quite likely to vote a communist representative
into government at sometime in the future.
Although various parties in Italian politics have
been concerned since the war to preventjust such
an outcome, the local elections of June 1975 and
general elections of June 1976 show that the Italian
Communist Party (PC! has made a major break-
through by winning votes from the habitual suppor-
ters of the CD 
- 
the middle and lower-middle class.(It should be noted though, that in the l9T6legisla-
tive elections the PCI and CD made their advance in
votes at the expense of the smaller parties.) People
hit by inflation have turned to the PCI and away
from the ruling CD partly because the PCI adopts a
social democratic approach 
- 
moderate, technocra-
tic, and socially conscious. Except for a slight
slump in their vote in 1956 the PCI is the only ltalian
party to have steadily increased its vote since the
war 
- 
from 22/" to over 30Y" 
- 
a vote which was
higher than the combined socialisUcommunist vote
at the 1948 general election. The CD have, by con-
trast, declined to around 38% of the poll and are
under attack from within, keeping power through a
precarious balancing of abstentions by other par-
ties. However, even if the PCI does achieve the
unlikely feat of becoming Italy's largest party, they
may still be kept out of government because they
would need an extra l2/o of the vote to deny the
centre parties the possibility of forming a coalition
themselves. So far the PSI, the small partner in the
centre-left coalition, has not been tempted to go in
for a popular front with the PCI largely because Sr.
de Martino 
- 
the leader 
- 
has resisted pressure from
the base to this effect.
The historic compromise
The fundamental communist call at the moment isfor the 'historic compromise' (compromesso
storico), which would be a coalition of Italy's three
major political force s : PCI, PSI, and Christian Demo-
crats. Berlinguer, the leader ofthe PCI, has rejected a
popular front coalition of socialists and communists
as too divisive and has noted that the CD are a'great
popular force' whose participation in government is
essential. Like most political doctrines the 'historic
compromise' has different definitions but it could
mean something similar to a constructive opposition
in which the party is consulted on major issues.
However, PCI and CD policies are starkly opposed in
many areas and the PCI has for years been denounc-
ing the CD power structure. One obstacle is the CD
itself, which grew up largely to keep the PCI out of
power and any 'historic compromise' would undoub-
tedly split Italian social democracy irreparably.
The exact nature of the PCI is a subject of some
discussion. It is one of the most interesting Western
communist parties and, with the Spanish, one of the
most liberaldemocratic. One big asset of the Italian
communists is their leader, Sr. Enrico Berlinguer. A
very popular party leader, Berlinguer has proved
tactically subtle in the past and has kept the dissent
within his own party to a minimum. The party is
frequently making avowals of democratic intent and
is not afraid to be called revisionist in its outlook. It
has a vote of about ten million, and members who
believe in its democratic credentials. It seems to be a
natural opposition party andits electoral strategy has
given it a whole host of policies drafted simply for
electoral appeal; moderate economic policies,
respect for foreign policy commitments, etc. The
party is not, however, monolithic andthere are differ-
ent factions within it such that it is always possible
that the old working-class revolutionary tradition on
which itdraws could reappear if conditions changed.
The present PCI policy is mildly reformist, calling
for a tightening of the tax laws (vital in ltaly), social
reform, reform in agri culture, hou sing, transport, and
health, and it puts a high priority onjob creation. The
PCI believes that Italy can recover through the
guarantee to Italian industry ofanew marketderiving
from planned government expenditure in social
fields. They would also like to use government credit
policy to help small firms, from whom they get much
support, but they have no plans for nationalisation or
even an extension of the public sector. Indeed, the
PCIblames ltaly'slarge and cumbersome state indus-
tries for many economic problems.
ltalian local government has been the laboratory
for testing PCI efficiency in administration and
there is plenty of evidence from the socialist-
communist coalitions which now rule Naples,
Milan, and Turin and some 30 million city dwellers.
The coalitions came to power when these cities
were badly in debt and when the central govern-
ment was in no position to help them, which
accounts for some criticisms that the communists
have been no better than their predecessors. How-
ever, the PCI has brought a breath of fresh air
into the atmosphere of corruption and stagnation
of city administrations without antagonising the
national strategy ofreassuring the middle-class of the
party' s good intentions.
The 1976 election
The 19T6Italiangeneral election was a bad one for
the smaller parties, and in particular for the PSI, who
had decided to provoke it. However, the PSI are still
the key to government formation although their lead-
ers sufferfrom indecision. The old leader, Francesco
de Martino, sticks to the election line that the PCI
must be brought into any centreleft government
whilst others want to squeeze reforms out of the CD
and wantan alliance with them. Because the election
was so indecisive and failed either to confirm the CD
in power or give the PCI its chance, Italy is likely to
continue in its present state of instability.
ELECTION RESULTS 
- 
7o of VOTES
Regional National Regional National(re70) (1e72) (te7s) (1976)
PCI (Communists) 27.9 28.3 33.4 34.4
PSI (Socialists) 10.4 9.8 12.0 9.6
Revolutionary Left 3.2 3.0 1.9
CD(ChristianDemocrats) 37.8 38.4 35.3 38.7
PSDI(Social Democrats) 7 .0 45.2 5.5
PRI (Republicans) 2.9 22.9 3.2 3.1
PLI (Liberals) 4.8 95.9 2.5 1.3
MSI (Extreme Right) 5.9 8.1 6.3 6.1
Dvorce Referendum May 1974 
- 
4l/" against divorce
59% pro-divorce laws.
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ITALY 
- 
Brief politicrl chronology
Proclamation of Italian kingdom (birth of
Italian state).
Beginning of heavy industry in the north but
lack of development of Mezzogiorno.
Universal suffrage.
Italy enters First World War.
PPI (Italian people's party), precursor ofCD,
founded.
Split of PCI and PSI (Communists and
Socialists).
Mussolini dictatorship.
National govemment with PCI ministers.
Government without PCI.
Referendum votesfora Republicby 12,717 ,923
to 10,719,824.
Electoral victory for CD and defeat of PCI-PSI
which ushers in centre-c_entre/right era under
de Gasperi.
Beginning of ltalian 'economic miracle'.
Centre-left era begins as PSI enters
government.
Student and worker unrest, progress ofleft in
elections.
Referendum on divorce results in defeat
for CD.
Strong PCI vote in regional elections.
Legislative elections, PCI progress.
Greece
In many respects Greece is the most interesting of the Southern European
countries under consideration here. It is not a country which can be called 'Latin'
but its politics partake of certain Latinfeatures, including a strong individualism,
concern with personality in politics, and (until recently) chronic political instabi-
lity capping a phenomenal rate of economic growth. The fact that Greece is not
a fully-fledged industrial country, but a land of small individualistic property
holders, indicates why leadership and personality have assumed an important
rdle in Greek politics. Only as Greece modernises will this feature decline in
importance.
Greek ties with the external world are undergoing re-adjustment as the coun-
try rids itself of military dictatorship and it is this particular re-orientation which
brings the country into the orbit of the EEC. Karamanlis, the Prime Minister, also
views Greek entry into the EEC as a potential guarantee of democracy, given the
chequered history of Greek politics in the past.
Greece 
- 
political background
Greek history, since independence from the
Ottomans in 1827 , has seen considerable instability.
From 1833 to 1967 one dynasty was deposed, five
kings fled, there were ten coups d'6tat, five con-
stitutions, forty-eight dissolutions of the parlia-
ment, 148 governments, and a Civil War from
1946-49. Associated with this instability has been
the nationalist search for a greater Greece, a search
which has often brought the army into politics and
brought the state into conflict with Turkey as boun-
daries were expanded. These two themes, persis-
tent in Greek political history, have been com-
pounded by a cleavage between left and right, not
obscured even in the resistance.
The elections of 1946 gave the monarchists a
majority and brought King George II back to the
throne, but they also signalled the beginning of the
Civil War between the communists and the Greek
National Army. From 1950, when the communist
challenge was beaten off, until 1967, Greece lived
under a parliamentary monarchy with an outlawed
Communist Party. The period was one of conserva-
tive rule first by the National Rally, and then later
the National Radicals, but in 1963 Karamanlis, the
then Prime Minister, compromised by the King's
meddling in politics, resigned. ln 1964, following
growing discontent, the left-inclined Giorgios
Papandreou obtained a 53o/" vote. There then
followed a period of considerable turmoil as
King Constantine (unconstitutionally) dismissed
Papandreou but could not find a stable alternative
Assembly majority.
The military took power in April 1967 in an
atmosphere of doubt and a belief by the right thatthe Centre Union would win the elections
scheduled for that year. The King attempted a
counter-coup later i; 1967 but failed-miseralily and
had to escape from the country. Within the militaryjunta George Papadopolous, the Prime Minister,
began to establish an ascendancy as thejunta drew
up a new constitution at the end of the 1960s. There
was talk about elections, but although martial law
was lifted in 1972 there was no sign of the military
returning the country to civilian rule. Indeed, they
simply increased their hold on the country until
mis-handling of the Cyprus situation (see below)
forced them to change their own methods.
A consequence of the Cyprus debacle was that
the Karamanlis government replaced the militaryjunta and in the somewhat rushed 1974 elections(the first free elections for ten years) he was con-
firmed in power. There was a good deal of voting
for personalities, with the electorate indicating, by
sticking with old experienced MP's rather than
going for newer faces, that it did not want drastic
changes. 1974 also saw a referendum on the monar-
chy in which only 30% voted in favour of keeping
Greece a kingdom. The monarchists and the anti-
monarchists both appealed to strong emotions but it
would seem that the argument that in Greek politics
the monarchy ensured the stability of institutions no
longer carried conviction for the majority of voters.
After the junta collapsed the Karamanlis govern-
ment released the prisoners held by the Colonels
and made moves to ensure the army's political
neutrality.
In May 1975 the new constitution worked out by
Karamanlis' New Democratic Party was put into
force and the first President was elected in June
1975. The constitution gave the President supreme
command of the armed forces, a highly controver-
sial move criticised by Papandreou (socialist) and
Mavros (centre), and one which will probably be
revised in future. That this was a quiet Change-over
was due to the Turkish threat of war, which enabled
Karamanlis to anticipate demonstrations by
calling-up students and young people under
emergency and martial laws. Legislation also
allowed numerous communists to return, though
only certain categories of them, a tight control
which helped to avoid major disruption.
Economic background
Greece is a land of small property owners and as
suih tends to be consefuative -politically and
economically. The country's economic problems
stem mainly from the large numbers of small hold-
ings, emigration, slow industrialisation, lack of
education, lack of cooperation among farmers, and
bad communications. Greece has some important
natural resources (such as bauxite) but its exports
are mainly agricultural and light industrial products,
as well as the enormous invisible export of ship-
ping. The trade balance has not been favourable
because of the turn in the terms of trade after the oil
crisis of 1973 and, because of higher raw material
prices. However, after a decline in the rate of
groMh (2.7 o/" in 197 4), the economy e xpanded agai n
by 65% in 1975, according to OECD figures.
Because of the good performance of cereal farming,
agricultural exports grew 14.2o/o in 1975. Manufac-
turing output grew at 17.6/o in 1975, which position
was generally satisfactory, with exports growing
faster than imports in value. There remains a big
trade gap, however.
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Greece and the Balkans
For historical, cultural and geographical reasons,
it is important to recognise that Greece has exten-
sive and indissoluble ties with the other Balkan
countries, ties which pull the country in a direction
somewhat away from the EEC. Despite the fact that
the bulk of Greek trade is with the EEC, a signifi-
cant proportion is with Bulgaria, Romania (both
in the Russian orbit), Albania, Yugoslavia and
Turkey.r
The background to Greek relations with the Bal-
kan states is the 1954 Treaty of Alliance for Political
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Tur-
key, Yugoslavia and Greece. The early 1970s saw
the flourishing of new and closer relations between
these Balkan states despite their apparently
opposed ideologies. The rapprochement between
the strongly anti-communist regime of the Colonels
and the widely different communist states of the
Balkans flourished, even despite Greek-Bulgarian
reservations on Macedonia.
The Greek dispute with Turkey centres on two
main areas; Cyprus and the Aegean Islands. The
Cyprus situation led to the eventual disposal of the
Colonels' regime which had thrust Greece into a
position for which it was militarily unprepared. The
Colonels fomented the Enosis (Union with Greece
movement) in Cyprus, thus de-stabilising the bal-
ance maintained by Archbishop Makarios, but they
were ultimately unable to aid Greek Cypriots.
Greece was somewhat disappointed by the reaction
of NATO to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the
inadequacy of that organisation to cover Greece's
defence problem made the Greek withdrawal from
NATO a possibility. Such a withdrawal in fact took
place under Karamanlis, though this does not affect
Greek links with the the EEC (in which Ireland, for
example, has never been a NATO member and
from which France has withdrawn).
Conflict in the Aegean dates back to the days of
the Ottoman Empire when the Greek state was
being created. The inclusion of many of the islands
in the Aegean, some of which are very close to
Turkish shores, caused disquiet because of the Tur-
kish view that the Dodecanese form a barrier
restricting their sea outlets. A dispute about the
limits of the continental shelf, the extent of territor-
ial waters, and rights over the Aegean is at present
before the International Court, but this may not
settle the matter. Within both countries there are
voices exhorting their respective governments to
more active foreign policies, and these pressures
are likely to increase if oil is discovered in the sea.
The Turks have already sent exploration vessels to
conduct research in disputed areas. For Greece,
conflict with Turkey could well be the crucial test of
its stability, and for NATO any conflict would pre-
sent a serious problem, for NATO values Turkey
(an ally in a crucial strategic position on the Russian
border), more highly than Greece. A very danger-
ous situation could thus still develop from a dispute
between Greece and Turkey, and the position in the
Mediterranean is by no means stable.
Recent political developments
The elections which produced the Karamanlis
government in 1974 were disadvantageous to theleft and probably under-state the opposition
strength. They produced a solidly conservative
government by the exploitation of Karamanlis' de
Gaulle-like charisma 
- 
'the man who ousted the
Colonels'. The left itself was divided and lacked the
most meagre basis of a party organisation. Since it
is the left that opposes Greek entry into the EEC it
is consequently easy to under-estimate the opposi-
tion that the move would evoke in Greece. The
communists, although not numerically strong,
would fight entry through the unions, if the union
organisation (smashed by the Colonels but anyway
always weak) were revived. New strike laws, out-
lawing certain kinds of strikes, especially 'political'
ones, make this most improbable however. Com-
munist youth movements and party organisations,
though not extensive, are beginning to be
organised.
The Greek election of November 1974 produced
the most successful campaign result for any single
party in Greek election history, with Karamanlis'
party winning 54.5% of the vote. The election came
after a curious series of events which started after
November 1973, when the then military junta was
preparing Greece for the first free elections since
1964 and was overthrown by an army faction bit-
terly opposed to these developments. President
Gizikis, the military leader, appointed the 'most
incompetent government in Greek history' (and
there is fierce competition for this title) which
included the 'hard' Brig. Ionnides, a man who even-
tually became the symbol of the military regime's
intransigence. Unfortunately for this (anti-
politician) army coup, the Ionnides government
soon got into trouble by meddling in internal Cyp-
riot affairs and their power was ended when the
chiefs of staff were forced to call in politicians to
find a solution. Karamanlis was called upon to
return from exile in Paris, but he substantially dic-
tated his own conditions and decided to more or
less restore the 1952 constitution.
Karamanlis in exile had gained (and cultivated)
the image of himself as a strong man and he com-
bined the adroit handling of the transition to demo-
cracy on his return with the credible implication
that if he failed the tanks would return to the
streets. Similar personal style aside, here is the
basis of the comparison with de Gaulle, a leader
who stepped in to get his country out of the
Algerian war crisis and who was also thought to be
the only barrier between democracy and chaos or a
military coup.
By contrast, the complete failure of the Greek
centreleft is striking. The opposition has never
really been successful in Greece and the short
period ofsuccess that it knew in 1964 was the direct
result of the personal charisma of Giorgios Papan-
dreou, father of the present left leader Andreas. The
former tended not to emphasise references to
economics in his socialism but rather legal and
social equality, a mixture that suited the property
conscious Greek electorate. The opposition in 1974
was unorganised and uninspired and although there
was no lack of tale,nt there were no really conspicu-
ous leaders in the group. The left and centre, any-
way itself split, generally had no alternative prG.
gramme to Karamanlis, and Papandreou often
appeared too radical in his financial views, hinting
at a degree of disruption for which the Greek electo-
rate was unprepared.
The period of the Colonels from 1967-1974 has
left a morass of problems which are not yet solved.
Parliamentary democracy is not yet absolutely sec-
ure and Karamanlis' handling of legal and constitu-
I Tmde betwen Greece and Turkey tripled rn the yeare 1972-1975 mainly because of
incr6ed productron md improved tmde onditions. The growth ls much higher if
value ather thil volume is reckoned (9% as opposed to 7.6%).
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tional issues has not always been impeccably cor-
rect or consistent. If his personal charismatic
authority is enough to cement the new elements
together this last point could be overlooked, espe-
cially if there is a de Gaulle-like acceptance of the
lKaramanlis
2Markensinis
3G. Papandreou and Venizelos
aG. Papandreou and Markensinis
sG. Papandreou
6Karamanlis and Markensinis
7A. Papandreou
new balance based on the personal stature of one
outstanding leader. Nevertheless, such authority
may herald long-term difficulties or even the col-
lapse of the present system due to bitter opposition.
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Brief political chronology
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Independence from Ottoman
Empire.
Becomes monarchy.
House of Gluckbbrg, 'King of
Hellenes'.
Internal, but divided, resistance
against the Germans and
Italians.
Elections give monarchy a
majority but many non-voters.
Civil War between (communist)
Free Democratic Government
and Britistr/American backed
Greek National Army.
American involvement in Greece
replaces that of UK.
Communists defeated.
Outlawed Communist Party but
parliamentary system.
Karamanlis Prime Minister.
Centre Union government under
Giorgios Papendreou.
Military coup.
Abortive counter-coup by King.
l-egislative advisory council set
up as an alternative to open
elections.
Papadopolous becomes Regent.
Collapse of military regime/
Cyprus crisis.
Karamanlis wins elections.
Withdrawal of troops from
NATO. Application to join EEC.
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The EEC and Southern Europe
. 
Although EEC relations with the countries considered here are fragmented,the possible action.of the EEC as a stabilising influence in southeril Europe
cannot be neglected.
New members
The EEC acts internationally through trade
qgreements and by admitting new members. Thefilst EEC agreement with Greece was signed in
1962, and eventual membership, after a twenty-two
year period, was envisaged. This agreement made
rapid progress in the years up to 1967 but was sus-
pendgd at the time of the Colonels' coup, which
ended Greek democracy, and only minor adjust-
ments were made from 1967 to 1974. There were
personal and emotional ties involved in freezing the
agreement since the former negotiators (from the
Greek Centre Union Party) were imprisoned and
the Commission made formal protests. When the
Colonels' regime collapsed in 1974 and the first
Greek post-coup government appeared, it received
a warm welcome in Brussels, and this was followed
by the quick acceptance of Greece as a member of
the "democratic community of Western nations",
as Callaghan put it. In June 1975 the Greeks applied
to join the EEC but there were reservations wittrin
the Commission such that the Greeks felt that they
had received a rebuff.
Portugal had relations with the EEC via EFTA. A
Portuguese application to the EEC is now out of the
questiol without massive aid to bring the economy
up to Western European standards. Substantial
EEC loans through the European Investment Bank
hav-e gone to Portugal, though they were delayed
until the criteria set by the Council bf Ministers-for
political evolution were fulfilled.
Spain had an agreement with the EEC in the
course of negotiation in autumn 1975 which was
intemrpted by the execution of political prisonersby Franco. The re-negotiation of a new trade
agreement with the Community has not yet begun
a_nd the slalling could be due to the desire to biingthe Spanish into the EEC when a new regime hai
been established. On this point Spain wiii have a
powerful sponsor (France), but membership will
only come when the political position is deciiled.
Enlargement
France has a grand strategy of a Mediterranean
vocation and the redressing of the balance of the
EEC before any northern enlargement (to Scan-
dinavia) takes place. The French are in favour of
new entrants from Southern Europe as they will
obviously make France more cential. Spain espe-
cially is seen as a natural ally to strengthen 'Latin
power', and France is the nearest thing to a Greek
'friend at Court'. The German government has long
had a close concern with Turkey and there is a
'symbiotic relationship' between Germany and
Turkey. Germany is an arms supplier to Turkey,
has a strategic interest in NATO's Eastern flarik
and Turkish migrant labour is 'exported' in signifi-
cant numbers to Germany. Germany has also spon-
sored Spanish membership of the EEC, -and
Genscher, leader of the FDP and Foreign Minister,
has stated that there is a special relatlonship with
Spain (the SPD is close to the Spanish PSOE
Socialist Party). Spain is regarded as important by
the UK 
- 
hence the British government minister at
Franco's funeral 
- 
although there are sections on
the left who have grave reservations about Spain,
dating from civil war days.
The Commission's luke-warm reaction to Greek
membership caused a stir, as it is the first time the
Council has been enthusiastic (on the politics of the
entry) and the Commission unenthusiastic (on the
economics). Enlargement presents many difficul-
ties, not least in terms of administration, for the
various institutions are only just beginning to settle
down after the last enlargement. Taking on board
Greece and Spain would present great difficulties to
the bureaucracy and to the Council. Choices also
have to be balanced with the report on Euro
pean Union suggested by the Belgian hemier
Tindemans, for enlargement would make Union
more difficult.
Depending on how many new states join the
EEC, when, how and at what level (whether there
are long or short transition periods) there are two
broad roads which the Community can take: a unit-
ary or two tier approach. The unitary approach
involves the coordination of policies of ten or ele-
ven member states, a method which barely works
with nine. More states merely compound the dif-
ficulties. ff the two tier approach is adopted then a
directorate will result, a choice which many think
will have divisive results and which could even spell
the end of the EEC as it now stands. The likely
impact of new members has certainly not been posi-
tively thought out, either in'Brussels or elsewhere,
and indeed is very hard to estimate given all the
uncertainties. The EEC does not even have a co-
herent foreign policy in the Mediterranean (on
Cyprus for example), so a whole range of problems
will be raised in this sector alone.
The implications of Spanish entry are much grea-
ter than those posed by Greek membership. Spain
has a population of thirty-five million and a diverse
series of industries. The UK would look with doubt
on competition from textiles and cars, and the
French would want protection from wine imports
which would compete directly with that part of the
French wine trade most in need of help 
- 
the low-
quality wine producers in Languedoc. Given either
Spanish, Greek or Portuguese entry, France could
well become a net contributor to the EEC and the
newcomers would force a re-thinking of the agricul-
tural policy (CAP). This will be more than a slight
re-shuffling and there could be real shocks in store
for the EEC. Potential communist ministers in gov-
ernments in Spain, Portugal and ltaly, could turn
domestic problems into wider issues involving the
EEC as a whole, though this is unlikely. Further-
more, the potential upset in post-Tito Yugoslavia
threatens to draw the EEC onto dangerous ground,
via the Italian and (possibly) Greek relations with
the area. The EEC likewise does not want to
become a party to any conflict between Greece and
Turkey, but if the Greeks do join the EEC will be
involved in the Aegean dispute, where large oil
finds could make the sea an important prize.
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Conclusion
Several points emerge concerning the r6le of the
EEC in Southern Europe. Though the EEC is one
of the biggest external influences in Southern
Europe, it-is clear that it is not equipped to move
rapidly or to deal with crises, nor has it the capacity
to- infiuence critical security issues, as have the
super-powers.r The EF.C can, however, shape the
environment of the regional periphery of Europe to
some extent and its capacity is very high even
where the ability to mobilise heavy resources is
low, e.g. in Greece and Spain. One point of EEC
influence, and consequently one difficulty, arises
from the finance of entry. If, for example, the
Greeks join the EEC, some 500m units of account(7lm dollars) will be necessary to accommodate an
indefinitely long entry period. Access to funds,
especially via the CAP, will upset the present bal-
an-ce and the new members will start to compete in
I ln secunty tems, relations are vra NATO and the Eurogroup, though not for Portug-
al, FBnce or (yet) Span. It is hkely that Sparush membership of the EEC wrll corncrde
wrth that of NATO
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BASIC STATISTICS : Portugal
Area 35,553 sq.ml.
GNP (1973) 276,639 m.Escudos.
Trade (1975)
Imports 97,58E m.Escudos,
49,335 m.Escudos.
BASIC STATISTICS : Spain
Area 194,E85 sq. miles
Trade (1975)
lmports c.i.f.
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